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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
1

STA1 E OF UTAH,
Plalintiff-Respondent,
-vs.LARENZO EUGEAN PARK,
Defendoot-A ppella;nt.

I
)

Case
No.10270

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The appellant Larenzo Eugean Park has appealed
from his conviction of the crime of negligent homicide
in violation of Section 41-6-43.10, Utah Code Annotated
1953, in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was tried on the crime alleged in the
information before the Honorable Merrill K. Faux,
Judge, setting without jury. Upon a full presentation
of the evidence, the court found the appellant guilty and
1

imposed a sentence within the permissible limits as pro.
vided by statute.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the decision of the trial
court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement of
facts and submits that it is more in keeping with the rule
that the decision of the trial court on appeal will be
viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict rendered.
The appellant was tried on the crime of automobile
homicide for the death of Milton Clyde McMillan on the
31st day of January, 1964. The accident in question occurred in the vicinity of 4800 South and 1246 West, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah (R. 30, 40). Running east
and west, 4800 South is a two-lane highway separated by
dotted white lines (Exhibit 8). A crosswalk runs north
and south at 1246 West. Two hundred feet west of the
crosswalk is a black and white sign with the words
"PEDESTRIAN LANE" (Exhibit 1). A street enters 4800
South just west of the crosswalk. This is 1250 West. On
the corner of 1250 West is an arc light and an arc light
is also located east of 1250 West (R. 30). There are
gravel shoulders on each side of 4800 South (R. 40, Ex·
hibit 8). Immediately adjacent to the crosswalk is the
Taylorsville Ward. At the time of the accident, 4800
South was black-topped nnd was dry (R. 40).
2

At approximately 8 :45 p.m., the appellant, operating a borrowed vehicle in which his girl friend was riding, was traveling east on 4800 South (R. 196, 205). The
appellant's vehicle passed two cars that had been in front
of him as he approached the crosswalk at 1246 West. The
appellant was familiar with the area and had driven past
the Taylorsville Ward on previous occasions and was
aware of its location (R. 205). Immediately after passing the two vehicles, the appellant pulled back into the
righthand lane of traffic where he observed cars parked
at an angle near the Taylorsville Ward and west of
1250 West (R. 206). The deceased Milton Clyde McMillan had apparently parked his car on the north side of
4800 South and walked south towards the Taylorsville
Ward through the crosswalk (R. 61). At a point ten
feet from the gravelled shoulder on the south side of
4800 South and directly in the center of the crosswalk,
the deceased was struck by the appellant's vehicle (Exhibit 8). The deceased was knocked and carried 140 feet
east of the point of impact and came to rest four feet four
inches from the north side of the roadway at 4800 South
in the opposite lane of traffic. His shoes were found
approximately 35 feet from the point of impact (R. 41,
45). The appellant's vehicle left 135 feet of skid marks
beginning from 1250 West, past the Taylorsville Ward,
in an easterly direction (R. 45). The average skid mark
from each of the wheels of the appellant's vehicle was
approximately 129 feet. The deceased was struck directly
in the center of the vehicle (Exhibits 6 and 9). The hood
ornament of appellant's vehicle broke off, piercing the
chest of deceased and lodging approximately five inches
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in the chest (R. 45, 90). The deceased received compound
fractures of both legs, broken ribs, head injuries and the
fatal wound in the chest (R. 43, 89 to 90). As a result of
the injuries sustained, Milton Clyde McMillan died.
The speed limit in the area is 35 miles per hour. The
surface of the road was dry and visibility was not ob.
scured although it was dark. The area where the aceident occurred was an area conjested with cars (R. 42).
The crosswalk was marked with worn white paint (R. 42).
A speed sign, indicating a speed limit of 35 miles an hour,
was posted on the south side of 4800 South, two-tenths
of a mile west of the pedestrian lane. The deceased had
been dressed in dark clothing, with a white shirt, and was
carrying a violin case, apparently to attend a dance which
was to take place at the Taylorsville Ward (R. 84, Exhibit 1).
Mr. William S. Oxley, who resides immediately across
the street from the Taylorsville Ward, was distracted by
a motorcycle going up the road and glanced out of his
window. He heard the impact of the car as it hit the
deceased and at approximately the same time heard the
brakes being applied (R. 36 and 37). This testimony was
corroborated by other witnesses who were standing in
the immediate area (R. 126). The appellant testified
that he did not apply the brakes until after he had hit
the deceased (R. 206, 207).
Immediately subsequent to the accident, officers from
the Salt Lake County sheriff's office performed brake and
skid tests on the same road surface. At 35 miles per
4

hour, they were able to leave 53 feet of skid marks.
Subsequently, sheriff's officers and officers from the
Highway Patrol also performed skid tests on the same
road. Based upon the skid tests performed by the sheriff's officers on the night in question, Sgt. Ed Pitcher of
the Highway Patrol estimated the appellant's speed at a
minimum of 63.8 miles per hour prior to application of
the brakes. Based upon the tests performed subsequently, the speed of the appellant's vehicle was estimated at a minimum of 53.845 miles per hour. The appellant and his girl friend both testified that they did not
look at the speedometer before the accident (R. 201, 218).
The appellant testified he did not see the 35 miles-perhour speed sign nor the sign advising of a pedestrian
lane (R. 215). He further testified that as he approached
the crosswalk, he did not look to the north, which was the
direction the deceased was coming from (R. 216). The
appellant estimated his speed between 35 and 40 miles
an hour prior to the accident (R. 207). He further testified that he stopped within two car lengths after the impact (R. 207). Based upon the above evidence, the trial
court apparently found that the appellant operated his
vehicle at a high rate of speed in a conjested area and
failed to keep a proper lookout, thus evidencing a reckless disregard for the safety of others, and rendered a
verdict of guilty.
Subsequently, the appellant was sentenced to six
months in the county jail and to a $500 fine. Although
the Department of Probation and Parole recommended
against probation because of the serious driving record
5

of the appellant (R. 13 through 15), the trial court
granted the appellant probation upon the condition that
he pay $250 of the fine and serve three months in jail.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO CON.
VICT THE APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.
The appellant in Point I of his brief argues that
the trial court should have dismissed the case at the end
of the state's presentation of its evidence. In Point III
of the appellant's brief, he argues that the evidence as
presented, when all the testimony is considered, is insufficient to warrant a conviction. The respondent will
answer the contentions of the appellant in one point.
Since after the presentation of the state's evidence
and after the appellant's motion to dismiss, the appellant
went forward with additional evidence, the original refusal to grant motion to dismiss has been waived and
the only question for decision is whether upon all the
evidence, the appellant's guilt has been shown. In
Wigmore, Evidence, § 2496, it is stated:
"Conversely, however, he cannot take advan·
tage of the judge's original erroneous refusal to
direct a verdict for insufficiency at the time of the
first motion, (a) if he does not renew the motion at
the close of all the evidence, or (b) or if at the
time of the final motion the ruling correctly rr6

fuses to order a verdict for insufficiency; for the
Court is at that time entitled to decide upon a
survey of the whole evidence; and this survey
naturally renders any prior error immaterial."
(Emphasis added)

In State v. Denison, 352 Mo. 511, 178 S.W. 2d 449 (1944),
the court said:
"Since appellant did not stand on it (first demurrer) but presented evidence in his own behalf,
the trial court was bound to take the latter evidence into consideration insofar as it helped the
State's case, in ruling on the second demurrer at
the close of the whole case.
It is apparent, therefore, that since appellant did not see
fit to stand upon the evidence as presented by state but
went forward and offered evidence in his own behalf, any
failure of the trial court to dismiss the evidence at the
end of the state's case has been waived and the sole
question preserved on appeal is whether the evidence
when taken as a whole justifies the conviction.

Section 41-6-43.10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides for the standard applicable in negligent homicide
cases. If a vehicle is driven "in reckless disregard of
the safety of others'' and results in the death of a person,
the individual so operating the vehicle may be guilty of
negligent homicide. The individual need not intend to
take the life of another person nor need he evidence a
<lisregard for life in general. Recently in People v. Dunleacy, Court of Criminal Appeal of Eire, (1948) Irish Reports 95, Justice Davitt explained the difference be-
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tween reckless disregard of life and reckless disregard
of safety, stating:
''To say a person is driving with a reckless
disregard for life means that he does not care
whether he kills anybody or not. Such a state of
mind will ordinarily, but perhaps not universally,
amount to general malice sufficient to justify a
conviction for murder. To say that a person is
driving with a reckless disregard for the safety
of others, may mean no more than he does not care
whether or not he puts them in danger. This may
amount to no more than dangerous driving. To
associate these two ideas is not to achieve the de.
sired mean, but possibly to import an ambiguity.
On the other hand, if the reference to recklessness
is merely omitted, the jury are hardly given all the
assistance which they are entitled to expect."
He concluded, relying upon Commonwealth v. W elansky,
55 N.E. 902 (Mass.):
''If the negligence proved is of a very high degree and of such a character that any reasonable
driver, endowed with ordinary road sense and in
full possession of his faculties, would realize, if
he thought at all, that by driving in the manner
which occasioned the fatality he was, without lawful excuse, incurring, in a high degree, the risk of
causing substantial personal injury to others, the
crime of manslaughter appears clearly to be es·
tablished. ''

Statutes similar to 41-6-43.10 have been enacted in
many states and a substantial number of countries fol·
lowing common law tradition. See Shannon, llfotor Ve·
hicle Offences, p. 329 etc. (Can. 1964). This court has
heretofore indicated that reckless disregard of the safety
8

of others requires more than inadvertence but does not
require a wilful nor malignant act. Rash inadvertence
or heedlessness may suffice. Thus, in State v. Berchtold,
11 U. 2d 208, 357 P. 2d 183 (1960), this court, in addressing itself to the standard required by the negligent homicide statute, stated:
""' "' • Our statute only requires reckless disregard for the safety of others, which is a much
greater lack of care than ordinary negligence, but
does not require as great a consciousness of the
danger confronted as wilful misconduct required
to create civil liability under our guest statute.
To be 'reckless' does not require 'wilfulness' but
means rather heedless, careless, and rash inadvertence to consequences.''
In the Berchtold case this court recognized that the
standard was similar to that discussed in State v. Lingman, 97 Utah 180, 91 P. 2d 457 (1939). In that case the
defendant was charged with manslaughter for operating
his vehicle at a high speed in a residential district, resulting in a collision which killed the driver of another
automobile. The court noted, on page 204 of Utah Reports, that going at a speed of forty miles an hour in a
residential area and failing to keep a proper lookout
would support the necessary lack of due care and circumspection, such that an instruction, under the manslaughter statute that the jury could convict if it so found
the facts, would be appropriate. The court noted at page
200 of Utah Reports :
''"' " " But if the jury finds that such speed might
produce death (which it well might), then he is
guilty of manslaughter, if in addition he did not
9

carefully watch the roa<l and for that reason an
accident occurred.''
It is apparent, therefore, from the above cases that
conduct closely paralleling that of appellant's in the instant case will suffice to sustain a conviction, since such
actions evidence the criminal negligence required by the
statute. In the instant case, taking the facts in a light
most favorable to the trial court's judgment, it appears
that the appellant was operating his vehicle at a speed
of up to 63 miles an hour in a residential zone. The
roadway was a two-lane highway, not well lighted. Thus,
the necessity for caution and circumspection on the part
of appellant was greater. The appellant failed to see a
speed sign, a pedestrian lane and a pedestrian-lane sign.
He failed to see the deceased by his own statement until
after he ha<l struck him. He had traveled in the area of
4800 South on previous occasions and was aware that
there was a church in the vicinity as well as the fact that
it was a residential neighborhood through which he was
traveling. He saw cars lined up at a 45° angle near the
church. Under these circumstances, it is apparent that
the appellant failed to keep a proper lookout and in fart
failed to use that caution that a reasonable driver "endowed with ordinary road sense'' would use. The appellant's vehicle knocked the deceased some 140 feet. According to witnesses, the deceased literally flew through
the air. The appellant's vehicle laid down 1:-3.J fort of
skid marks. In this case, the evidence clearly discloses
that appellant's conduct was a callous disregard of the
dangerous circumstances that any reasonable man would
have appreciated. The driving of a motor vehicle at an
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excessive and high rate of speed is negligence in many
circumstances, State v. Lingman, supra, but driving at
an excc~ssive and high rate of speed in a residential area,
disregarding warning signs and other circumstances
which would put a person on notice of the possibility of
the harm to others, is driving in reckless disregard for
the safety of others. Here the appellant passed two cars
immediately before entering the conjested area where the
accident occurred. He traveled at a high rate of speed.
He failed to fully examine the road in front of him. He
failed to appreciate the likelihood of persons being in
the area. He failed to observe the speed limit and warning signs. He was, without doubt, guilty of failing to
exercise care for the safety of others.
In People v. Black, 111 Cal. App. 90, 295 P. 87 (1931),
the court, affirming a conviction for manslaughter for
driving a vehicle in such a wilful or wanton manner as
to disregard the safety of other persons, held that where
the defendant at half past eight in the evening drove his
automobille across a poorly lighted blind-street intersection at a speed in excess of 15 miles per hour, struck
a pedestrian at a crossing and skidded some 64 feet after
he had applied the brakes, was properly convicted based
on recklessness. Commonwealth v. Godshalk, 76 Pa.
Super. 500 (1921), held that where an individual drove
his vehicle at 35 miles an hour past a stop sign and struck
a pedestrian walking on the highway, the driver's conduct was reckless. In Commonwealth v. Eck, 1 Lycoming 23 (Pa. 1949), the defendant drove at a high rate of
speed in a congested area, struck two boys on a bicycle
11

and left long skid marks. The court found the conduct
tantamount to recklessness. In People v. Lett, 77 Cal.
App. 2d 917, 177 P. 2d 417, the court sustained a conviction of manslaughter under a statute similar to the previous Utah manslaughter statute, where the defendant
struck the decedent in a crosswalk and where he did not
sound his horn or stop although he was blinded by oncoming lights. In People v. Flores, 83 Cal. App. 2d 11,
187 P. 2d 410 (1947), the defendant was convicted of
having caused the death of a human being by his gross
neglect in driving a vehicle. The defendant, traveling
at a speed of 50 to 60 miles an hour in a residential area
of Los Angeles, passed a car, struck a man in the vicinity
of an intersection, throwing him into the air, and continued on. The court stated:
'' • • • and where a driver did not see his victim until the instant of impact or not at all, he is
guilty of gross negligence or of an entire indifference to those who were using the street or highways simultaneously with him.''

In Regina v. Jeffers, 7 Criminal Law Quarterly 243,
(C. C. Nova Scotia 1963), the defendant was convicted of
driving his vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public,
having regard to the circumstances of the accident, in
viola ti on of ~ 22 1 ( 4) of the Canadian Criminal Code. The
defendant struck a boy on a bicycle while traveling at a
speed of 45 to 50 miles an hour in Halifax County in the
evening. In sustaining the conviction, in a long and carefully analyzed opinion, the court gave consideration to
Canadian, American and English cases and found that in
view of the circumstances, the nature of the danger in-
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volved, the appellant's conduct was seriously dangerous
to the public under the circumstances. See also Regina v.
Beck, 7 Criminal Law Quarterly 370 (C. C. Nova Scotia
1964), where the court sustained a conviction where the
individual drove at a speed of 55 to 60 miles an hour in a
residential area of Hal ifax.

It is apparent, therefore, that the evidence in this
case is sufficient to sustain a conviction when viewed
against the facts involved and the breadth of precedence
dealing with similar statutes.
The appellant can take no comfort from the fact
that deceased was dressed in dark clothing or was a small
man. Small men have as much right on the highway as
large men.
Further, there is no showing that the appellant
even saw the man until he struck him although there was
substantial indication from the surrounding circumstances that should have caused him to anticipate the possible presence of others. Even so, in State v. Husby, 102
Utah 416, 131 P. 2d (1942), this court sustained a conviction for manslaughter resulting from the death of a person in a crosswalk even though the defendant had the
green light. The court noted that the contributory negligence of the deceased, if any, would not be a defense in
the face of criminal negligence.
The evidence in this case is sufficient to sustain the
conviction.
13

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COl\IMlTTED NO ER.
ROR IN REJECTING THE TESTIMONY OF
MR. HARVEY FLORENCE, A WITNESS FOR
THE DEFENDAN'l1 •
Subsequent to the time of trial, the court indicated
that he could not give credence to the testimony of ~Ir.
Harvey Florence, a witness who testified for the defendant. 1\Ir. Florence's testimony was inconsistent to somp
extent with the testimony of other witnesses. He testified that in his opinion the appellant was traveling no
faster than 40 miles per hour. Contrary to the inference
in appellant's brief, Mr. Florence based his opinion only
on the speed he observed subsequent to the impact, after
observing the squeal of appellant's brakes, and from thP
time of impact to the time of stop (R. 161). The appellant's contention is that the trial court did not have the
prerogative to reject Mr. Florence's testimony unless he
had an interest of some pecuniary nature in the litigation or some relationship to a party, or other property
interest in the litigation (Appellant's Brief, p. 17). The
trial court indicated that he did not believe the testimony
of Mr. Florence because of his demeanor of the stand, his
argumentative nature and his apparent interest in forcing the court to accept his views. The trial court indicated that he felt he could believe one witness against
many and could take into consideration the demeanor of
the witness and his appearance on the stand. The appellant for his position on appeal argues that this j,
improper.
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It is well settled that a court may consider the bias
of a witness, including his friendly feeling towards a
party, his hostility, self-interest, or other matters which
tend to detract from his testimony. McCormick, Evidence, § 40 (1954). It was the duty of the court to appraise the testimony of Mr. Florence, based on his consistency with other testimony and other evidence. It is
further the court's prerogative to discount Mr. Florence's testimony if he found that it was in part false or
if the demeanor of the witness was such that he believed
he was not being accurate or telling the whole truth. In
58 Am. Jur., Witnesses,§ 865, p. 494, it is stated:

'"' • • It is proper for the jury to take into
account a witness' interest, bias, or prejudice, his
character, conduct, or habits, the falseness of his
testimony in part, the appearance, manner, and
demeanor of the witness while testifying, his apparent frankness and intelligence, his capacity
for consecutive narration of acts and events, the
probability or improbability of the story related
by him, the advantage he appears to have had for
gaining accurate information on the subject, and
the accuracy or retentiveness of his memory as
well as the lapse of time affecting it."
11 his court has clearly recognized that the above are
proper factors to be weighed by a jury or the trier of fact
in reaching a verdict.

In Gittens v. Lundberg, 3 U 2d 392, 284 P. 2d 1115
(1953), this court observed :

"It is the duty of this court to leave the question of credibility of witnesses to the jury or fact
trier and we have quite consistently adhered to
15

that policy. As has often been said, the jury i~
in a favored position to form impressions as to
the trust to be reposed in witnesses. They have
the advantage of fairly close personal contact; the
opportunity to observe appearance and general
demeanor; and the chance to feel the impact of
personalities. All of which they may consider in
connection with the reactions, manner of expres.
sion, and apparent frankness and candor or want
of it in reacting to and answering questions 011
both direct and cross-examination in determinin~
whether, and to what extent, witnesses are to be
believed.''
It is apparent, therefore, that the trial court actecl
properly in dismissing the testimony of a witness which
he felt was not credible. Further, to the extent that the
court had before it good and sufficient evidence for its
verdict, it is well established that this court will not interfere merely because from the dry record on appeal, it
appears that the testimony of a witness might have
merit. Most recently, in Carling v. Industrial Commis·
sion, et al., No. 10177, February 19, 1965, this court
observed:

"• • • A reversal because of an erroneous statement by the Commission would be justified only
if it appeared that it was so mistaken in fact or
law that in its absence there would be a reasonable
likelihood of a different result."

In Walker v. Peterson, 3 U. 2d 54, 278 P. 2d 291 (1954),
this court further observed:
"It is true generally that statements made hy
a trial judge do not necessarily affect the validity
of a judgment if it is otherwise sustainable."

16

From the above authorities, it is manifestly apparent that the appellant's position, that the trial court had
a mandatory duty to afford full weight to Mr. Florence's
testimony, is without foundation in law. The trial court
had the full advantage of seeing Mr. Florence, gauging
his responsiveness to the questions asked, weighing his
credibility and resolving the evidence that he gave
against other testimony with which it might conflict.
The trial court found that the testimony of Mr. Florence
was not to be accorded weight. This was well within
the discretion of the trial court and presents no basis for
relief on appeal.
POINT III
THE SENTENCE OF THE TRIAL COURT
SHOULD BE SUSTAINED ON APPEAL
SINCE (a) THE ISSUE IS MOOT, AND (b)
THE SENTENCE WAS OTHERWISE WITHIN THE POWER OF THE COURT.
In Point IV of Appellant's Brief, it is argued that
the court erred in sentencing the defend ant. The sentence of the court was that the appellant be confined in
the county jail for six months and pay a fine of $500.
That sentence was suspended upon condition that appellant voluntarily submit himself to confinement in the
county jail for three months and pay a fine of $250. Section 41-6-43.lO(b) provides:
"(b) Any person convicted of negligent homicide shall be punished by imprisonment in the
county jail for not more than one year or by fine
of not less than $100 nor more than $1,000, or by
both such fine and imprisonment.''

17

Thus, the sentence as imposed and as reduced upon a
term of probation was well within the legal limits which
the statute authorized.
The appellant contends that the sentence as imposed
deprived him of a right to appeal. This argument is a11
obvious absurdity. The case is now before the court on
appeal and the sentence has not been changed. The trial
court in no way conditioned the sentence upon the appe\.
lant foregoing his appellate rights. Such a condition
was not even alluded to. The sentence of three months in
the county jail and a fine of $250 is still the sentence of
the trial court and the appellant may still accept these
terms as conditions to probation. As a consequence, so
much of the appellant's argument that the sentence d~
prived him of a right to appeal is without merit. Further,
since the appellant has in fact appealed and apparently
without prejudice to the original sentence, the argument
is moot.
Additionally, the appellant argues that the probationary condition, that the appellant serve three months
in the county jail and pay a fine of $250, is illegal because
it goes beyond the standard of good behavior. The appellant has cited no case to the effect that good behavior is
the only condition upon which probation can be imposed.
To the contrary, the law knows no such limitation. It j,
generally that conditions of probation are unrestricted
except that a condition which is illegal, immoral or impossible may not be imposed. See State v. Harris, llfi
Kan. 387, 226 P. 715 (1924); 39 Am. Jnr., Pardon, 87. It
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fs generally the rule of law that any condition of probation which is within the original power of the court to
impose as part of the sentence is valid. See Rubin, et al.,
The Law of Criminal Correction, p. 197 to 204; 24 C.J.S.,
Criminal Law, 1571(8).
Section 77-35-17, Utah Code Annotated 1953, allows
the court to suspend a sentence and place the individual
on probation. The court in effect has done this in this
instance by either (a) suspending all the sentence and
imposing a fine and sentence as part of probation, which
is permissible (24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, 1571(8), p. 475),
or merely suspending part of the sentence, which is also
permissible. In the instant case, the conditions of probation were substantially less than the original sentence
that could have been imposed by the court. They were in
110 way in excess of the court's power and, therefore, were
neither illegal, immoral or impossible of performance.

It must be concluded that the sentence of appellant
was proper in all respects.
CONCLUSION
'rhe evidence in the instant case clearly demonstrates
that the appellant was guilty of the crime as charged.
'rhe appellant displayed a reckless disregard for the
safety of others and operated his motor vehicle in a man1wr which brought death to an otherwise innocent citizen.
The carnage on the highways of the State of Utah
and the nation in general is a problem that has warranted

consideration by the legislatures of the states and the
courts who are charged with enforcing the law. Had the
appellant merely chosen to obey the rules and regulations
prescribed for the operation of motor vehicles on the
highways of the State of Utah and had he shown the care
and concern for the safety of others instead of the heedless, reckless indifference he displayed, the crime would
not have occurred and this appeal would not have taken
place. The evidence before the trial court was more than
sufficient to prove the appellant's guilt.
The other arguments urged for reversal are at best
frivolous. This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE,
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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